Dance is mimetic. Rhythms are felt, movements are strung, and language is spoken.

The 1988 Act is the basis by which copyright, and the protection it provides, is governed. It is important to note that I will be examining this piece of work through the United Kingdom legal jurisdiction lens. A three-stage criterion needs to be fulfilled for copyright to exist.

First, the work must fall under a category of “copyright work”. The CDPA does not specifically provide a definition for choreographic work, however it does state that “dramatic work” includes a work of dance or mime. Therefore, dance choreography is protected as dramatic work (s.3 (1)(b) CPDA 1988).

Second, the work must be original. There is a relatively low level of originality required for the subsidence of copyright. Contemporary case law dictates that “it is only through the choice, sequence and combination of those words that the author may express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result that is an intellectual creation.” (Infopaq International v Danske Dagblades Forening: ECJ 17 Jul 2009) Applying the Infopaq standard, this work is the intellectual creation of the choreographer, thus it satisfies the originality requirement.

Lastly, the work must be a in a fixed and tangible medium. At times, this line may be difficult to distinguish; the dancer and the dance are separate entities. The fixed work in which the copyright resides holds copyright protection, not the performance of the work. As the choreography has been captured in video form, it has been sufficiently fixed (s.3(2)).

In relation to Hope, if the choreographer Emma Portner solely originates the dance, then she is the sole author of the work. If she collaborated with the dancer to develop the choreography, there is a possibility that they will become joint authors. Having a clear understanding of copyright ownership is important because the rights granted to the owner, author, and performer differ. Within choreography culture, it is assumed that the choreographer is the author of the dance and the copyright, but it is important to be specific and identify who has expressed authorial input into the choreography. Although there is limited case law on choreography, Brighton v Jones (2 [2004] EWHC 1157 (Ch)) noted that “contributions to the interpretation and theatrical presentation of the dramatic work” (ibid para 56) does not confer authorship – it is only contributions to the work itself. If the dancer interprets the choreographer’s instruction with very little creative exertion of their own, their input does not result in copyright. However, it does give rise to performers’ rights in Part II of The 1988 Act. It is assumed in Hope that the choreographer has the most authorial input, the dance being a product of her creativity, allowing her to be considered the author of the copyright.